In response to the XYZ Corp: If it is true the dumping truly harmed no one, then I do not see it as harmful. You could say that they took an unacceptable risk that we should not allow them to repeat, but they didn't do anything harmful, at least not directly. I don't understand why this would be harmful if there were no future births either, and I can't tell if this is what you believe of if you were proposing it for the sake of argument.

I think you can harm hypothetical people once they cease to be hypothetical, and I have cited global warming as an example, but not hypothetical people who never exist.

I also think you can harm existing humans by depriving them of happiness in the future, which doesn't necessarily mean killing them. Failing to educate young children for example harms them by reducing their future prospects. Does saying not educating children harms them in the future also bind me to say that we harm hypothetical people by not creating them?

1. This wasn't intended to be an evasion, but a qualified concession. The harmfulness of the infant's death is increased if it's expected lifespan would have been increased by medical innovation or policy BUT this harm is miniscule compared to the gains. I do not see how this kills deprivationism.

2. I think we have reached a point where infanticide is necessary to discuss. Infanticide is only unusual in 2020 America, in human history it was anything but unusual.

3. I do not think hypothetical humans are harmed by being left as they are. You might be able to argue that aggregate happiness is increased by having children, and making hypothetical people not hypothetical, but this is a empirical question that also rides on other considerations of population growth.